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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BETTY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
PEKEY A. PETERSON, M.D., and
VALLEY WEST HOSPITAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, dba VALLEY
WEST HOSPITAL,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
13803

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
PERKY A. PETERSON, M.D.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a medical malpractice action alleging damages for pain and mental suffering of the appellant as
a result of a stillbirth.
DISPOiSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A jury returned a unanimous verdict of no cause
of action against the appellant and in favor of both respondents.
1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts violates the rule
that the evidence should be viewed "in the light most
favorable" to the parties who won the verdict of the
jury. Rivets v. Pacific Finance Co., 16 Utah 2d 183, 397
P.2d 990 (1964); Paull v. Zions First National Bank,
18 Utah 2d 183, 417 P.2d 759 (1966). The facts will
therefore be restated and the parties will be designated
by name or as they appeared in the trial court.
The plaintiff engaged the services of Dr. Peterson
in January, 1971, soon after she became pregnant and
continued under his care throughout the term of her
pregnancy. (R. 334.) The plaintiff was then 42 and
had previously given birth to seven children. (R. 333,
357.) On September 2, 1971, the plaintiff went to Dr.
Peterson's office for a routine examination. Dr. Peterson examined her shortly before 4:00 p.m. and, although
she was not having contractions, he observed that the
cervix was thinned out and was beginning to dilate indicating that labor might be imminent. (R. 251.) At the
time of the examination, the doctor also observed that
the membranes were bulging, but the bag of waters
had not ruptured. (R. 274.) Since the plaintiff was
several days overdue, the doctor elected to send her to
the hospital to induce labor that evening. (R. 247, 274.)
Dr. Peterson advised the plaintiff to go directly to the
hospital, but agreed that she could stop by her home
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since she had asked to do so. (E. 274, 339.) The doctor
then notified the hospital that she was to be admitted
for labor induction and informed the nurse that the
plaintiff's membranes were bulging, but had not ruptured. (E. 274.)
The plaintiff arrived at the hospital at approximately 4:40 p.m. where she was promptly admitted and
put to bed. (E. 339, 326.) She informed the supervising nurse that she had not felt any contractions or pain
and did not express any complaints to the hospital staff.
(E. 356-357, 328.) In accordance with Dr. Peterson's
standard admission orders, the nurses administered an
enema and recorded the fetal heart tones. (E. 265, 326.)
Thereafter, the plaintiff remained in her room until
approximately 6:30 p.m., during which time she did
not experience any pain or contractions. (E. 356-357.)
During this period, the nurses were assisting in a complicated delivery, but were available if plaintiff had
needed help. There was a call button at her bedside
and her sister was with her but neither called for assistance. (E. 407, 357.)
At approximately 6:30 p.m., the nurses delivered
drug infusion equipment to the plaintiff's room and
began preparations for administration of labor-inducing
medication. (E. 409.) The nurses had some difficulty
regulating the infusion pump, but no medication was
delivered until the machine was operating properly.
(E. 412-413.) Two or three minutes later, Dr. Peterson arrived at the plaintiff's room and, after adjust3
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ing the infusion pump to deliver the medication to the
plaintiff, he immediately examined her just as she was
experiencing her first contraction. (R. 413, 259-260.)
Dr. Peterson's internal examination revealed that
the umbilical cord was looped and was protruding into
the plaintiff's vagina. (E. 260.) The doctor immediately
pushed the baby's head upward in the birth canal and
held it there to release pressure from the cord to allow
resumption of circulation and administered oxygen to
the plaintiff. (R. 262.) Despite these resuscitation efforts, which continued for 10 to 15 minutes, no resumption of fetal life was detected. (R. 263.) The labor induction was then resumed and the stillborn child was
delivered approximately two hours later. (R. 263-264.)
Dr. John W. Harris, a qualified Salt Lake City
obstetrician was produced by plaintiff as an expert
witness and he testified that in the Salt Lake City hospitals with which he was familiar, when a maternity
patient was admitted to the hospital, the standard practice required an abdominal and vaginal examination of
the patient and the nurses should inquire if the patient's water had broken and they should listen to, and
record, the fetal heart tones. He further testified on
direct examination that a vaginal examination should
"be done by some personnel" if induction of labor was
to be commenced by the use of an infusion machine.
(R. 295, 297, 300, 318.) On cross-examination, Dr.
Harris conceded that the requirement of an abdominal
examination would be met by either finger palpitation
or by listening with a stethoscope (R. 306) and if the
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membranes had not ruptured, there would be no need
for a vaginal examination where, as in the present case,
the patient came to the hospital immediately after a
vaginal examination by the doctor in his office. (R. 308.)
A vaginal examination by the nurse might, or might not,
determine if the membranes had ruptured because this
is often a difficult determination, even for an obstetrician. (R. 309.)
Dr. Harris further admitted on cross-examination
that the requirement of a vaginal examination before
the machine induction of labor began would be satisfied
if the doctor performed such an examination at about
the time the machine was started (R. 311, 312) and the
evidence is undisputed that Dr. Peterson performed
such an examination at that time. The nurses had had
difficulty in getting the machine to operate and when
Dr. Peterson arrived, the patient was not getting any
medication and he turned the "stop cock" to direct the
flow of medication into the patient. He then made a
vaginal examination as soon as he could don the necessary sterile gloves. (R, 286, 287.)
Dr. Harris' testimony, as it remained after crossexamination, was in substantial accord with that of Dr.
Peterson, the only other medical expert who testified.
Neither witness could state when the umbilical cord
prolapsed but pressure from the head of the fetus on
the cord could have caused the death of the fetus even
before the prolapsed cord protruded into the birth
canal. (R. 277,310, 311.)
5
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Dr. Harris agreed that it was a proper exercise of
judgment by Dr. Peterson to send the patient to the
hospital for later induction of labor in view of his findings in the office examination and that to send her at
that time evidenced a proper concern for the safety of
the patient. He further agreed that under the standard of practice, an obstetrician sending a patient to the
hospital under such circumstances had the right to
expect a call from the hospital, after the patient's arrival, if there was any development or progress in the
patient's condition. (R. 304, 305.)
Since the effect of the medical testimony was that
Dr. Peterson properly exercised his judgment in sending the patient to the hospital for later induction of
labor and since it was undisputed he had received no
information indicating any adverse development in the
patient's condition and since the umbilical cord was
found to be prolapsed and lifeless upon his arrival and
it was not then possible to avert the death of the fetus,
there remained no basis for the jury to find that he
had been negligent or that his conduct had proximately
caused the damage of which plaintiff complained and
thus the unanimous verdict of no cause of action against
Dr. Peterson was fully supported by the record in this
case.
Prior to the reception of evidence, counsel for plaintiff submitted and argued a motion in limine in an attempt to prevent the jury from learning the circumstances under which the pregnancy began, the fact of
its illegitimacy and the fact that plaintiff was divorced
and on welfare. (R, 200-206.) However, during cross-
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examination by counsel for the hospital, Dr. Peterson
was asked to explain why his initial office record concerning the plaintiff listed her name as Billie Jean
Rex but later entries showed the name "Betty Nelson."
Dr. Peterson replied that during the pregnancy, the
plaintiff was required to give proper identification to
the welfare department and as a result he then learned
her name was Betty Nelson and that the pregnancy was
illegitimate. (R. 268.)
Plaintiff's attorney made an immediate motion for
a mistrial which was extensively argued, during which
it was pointed out to the Court that plaintiff, in her
complaint against Dr. Peterson, claimed damages for
mental distress and anguish, embarrassment and humiliation and that the fact of illegitimacy would be a relevant and material factor in the jury's evaluation of
whether the plaintiff had in fact sustained such damage. The Court agreed and denied the motion for mistrial, stating that plaintiff "is here claiming great
mental anguish because of the loss of the child. I think
the fact that it was an illegitmate child might very well
have a bearing upon that very thing" (R. 268-273.)
Defendants' motions for a directed verdict after
plaintiff rested (R. 372-390) and at the conclusion of
all the evidence (R. 437-438) were taken under advisement by the Court, (R. 437, 438.) The jury returned a
unanimous verdict for both defendants. (R, 18, 456, 457.)
Plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and her alternative motion for a new trial were
denied (R. 9, 10) and this appeal followed. (R. 5.)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE VERDICT IS CLEARLY SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
In a malpractice case of this kind, plaintiff has the
burden of establishing, by expert medical testimony, not
only the standard of care, but the claimed deviation
from that standard. Dickinson v. Mason, 18 Utah 2d
383, 432 P.2d 663 (1967); Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah
2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1956); Anderson v. Nixon, 104
Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216 (1943). Similar principles apply to the proximate causation of the injuries alleged.
Expert testimony must be produced to show that the
injuries were probably caused by the physician's deviation from the standard of care. Without such evidence,
there is nothing upon which a jury can base its finding
on causation. Mere neglect or lack of skill is not enough.
Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 223, 310 P.2d 523 (1957);
Forrest v. Eason, 123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178 (1953);
Anderson v. Nixon, supra.
When these principles are applied to the facts of
this case, it is apparent that the jury's verdict was compelled by the plaintiff's failure to establish the basic
elements of proof required in this kind of case. These
principles have been uniformly applied by this Court
in medical malpractice cases for more than 40 years
but plaintiff's brief does not contain a single citation
of authority, either from Utah or elsewhere, on the
subject of medical malpractice and the proof required
to establish it.
8
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To support her claim of negligence against Dr.
Peterson, plaintiff relies solely upon testimony given
by Dr. Harris (plaintiff's brief P. 5, 6) but examination reveals plaintiff's reliance is misplaced when Dr.
Harris' testimony is considered in its entirety. It is
fundamental that " testimony of a witness on his direct
examination is no stronger than as modified or left by
his further examination or by his cross-examination.
A particular part of his testimony may not be singled
out through the exclusion of other parts of equal importance bearing on the subject." Alvarado v. Tucker,
2 Utah 2d 16 268 P.2d 986 (1954).
While Dr. Harris testified that a patient should be
given an abdominal or vaginal examination upon admission to the hospital, he agreed on cross-examination
that this would not be necessary if the patient had been
examined by her physician immediately prior to coming to the hospital and her amniotic membrane had not
ruptured. (B. 308.) It was undisputed that Dr. Peterson had examined the patient just before admission and
that the membrane was then intact. (R. 245.)
Further, Dr. Harris testified on direct examination that a vaginal examination should be performed
prior to machine induction of labor (R. 300) but he
admitted upon cross-examination that this requirement
was satisfied by the examination Dr. Peterson performed
immediately after turning the stop cock to permit the
drug from the machine to begin labor induction. (R. 311,
312.)
9
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Finally, cross-examination of Dr. Harris revealed
that Dr. Peterson had properly used his medical judgment and his concern for the patient when he sent her
to the hospital and under the applicable standard of
practice prevailing in the community of obstetricians,
Dr. Peterson had the right to expect a call from the
hospital, after the patient's admission, if there was any
development or progress in the patient's condition. It
is undisputed that no such call was ever made to Dr.
Peterson. (R. 258, 304, 305.)
While it is thus apparent that the claim of negligence evaporated under the cross-examination of plaintiff's expert there is even greater weakness in her claim
of causation. Plaintiff apparently concedes this weakness because the only portion of her brief relating to
negligence and causation contains not one word of contention that anything Dr. Peterson did, or failed to do,
was the proximate cause of the death of the fetus.
The only mention of proximate cause is found on
page 6 of plaintiff's brief wherein this highly significant statement may be found:
Furthermore, it is also evident as a reasonable
medical probability, that the cause of death of
the fetus could have been avoided had the hospital made its required examinations and followed
procedures which were within the standard of
care required by hospitals in the community.
(Emphasis supplied)
Plaintiff's brief does not mention, nor does the evidence suggest, any action Dr. Peterson could have taken
10
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to avoid the death of the fetus and even the claim of
causation as against the hospital was found to be without solid foundation when Dr. Harris admitted that it
was purely speculative whether the fetus would have
survived even if the prolapsed umbilical cord had been
promptly discovered. (R. 312, 313, 314, 315.)
Plaintiff's failure to produce evidence of proximate
causation as against Dr. Peterson is fatal to her claim
against him. This Court succinctly stated the rule in
Hug gins v. HicJcen, supra, as follows:
As a general rule in a malpractice action, expert
testimony must be produced to show that the injuries alleged were probably caused by the lack
of due care of defendant. In the absence of such
evidence, there is nothing upon which a jury can
base its finding on the proximate cause of the
injury. The evidence must be substantial and
must, in cases of this complex type, have foundation in expert medical testimony.
The verdict in this case demonstrates the jury's
conclusion that negligence, or causation or both had not
been proved and under familiar principles of review,
the verdict should be upheld by this Court.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE
OF ILLEGITIMACY AND IN ITS DENIAL
OF A MISTRIAL.
Plaintiff's motion in limine sought to prevent disclosure to the jury that plaintiff was on welfare, that
this pregnancy was illegitimate and that it resulted from
11
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a one-night encounter with a man whose identity was not
known to the plaintiff. In granting the motion, in part,
the Court commented that an inquiry as to the identity
of the father of the child "is not material or relevant
here" and then the Court continued " I would suggest
counsel that you not dwell upon that and not talk to
the jury about the fact that the child was born out of
wedlock." (R. 204.)
In cross-examination by counsel for the defendant
hospital, Dr. Peterson was asked the name plaintiff
gave when she first came to him as a patient and since
the record contained a later entry with a different name,
he was asked when the second name was first given to
him and in his response to that series of questions, he
inadvertently disclosed the fact that plaintiff was on
welfare and that the pregnancy was illegitimate.
Plaintiff's counsel made an immediate motion for
a mistrial and extensive argument followed. When it
was pointed out to the Court that plaintiff's complaint
sought damages for mental distress, mental anguish,
embarrassment, humiliation and nervousness, it became
apparent to the Court that the jury should be told the
truth of the matter and if they were permitted to consider the case upon the assumption that this was a
normal and legitimate pregnancy, any verdict would be
based upon a completely false premise. The Court further agreed that the defendants would be prejudiced if
the truth were withheld from the jury and since plaintiff was claiming mental anguish, the Court decided that
12
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the fact that the pregnancy was illegitimate " might verywell have a bearing upon that very thing.'' The motion
for mistrial was therefore denied. (R. 271, 272, 273.)
Plaintiff has cited no authority in support of her
claim that the reception of such evidence and the denial
of the mistrial constituted an abuse of discretion which
would justify reversal of this judgment.
Rule 45, Rules of Evidence, bestows wide discretion in the trial court in its rulings upon evidence and
Utah case law makes it clear that in a review of a trial
court's refusal to grant a mistrial, plaintiff has the
burden of persuading this Court that the trial court
was "plainly wrong." Burton v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249. P.2d 514 (1952).
Plaintiff has presented no facts, no legal authority
and no argument to satisfy that burden and since the
trial court carefully weighed the conflicting contentions
of the parties and concluded that no prejudice would
result, plaintiff has failed to carry the burden of persuasion in this Court and the trial court should be affirmed in its rulings.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING
THAT DAMAGES MAY NOT BE RECOVERED FOR WRONGFUL DEATH OF AN
UNBORN FETUS.
Since the jury determined the issues of liability
against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendants the
Court's decision that damages are not recoverable for
13
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the death of the unborn fetus is moot and need not be
considered on this appeal. Nevertheless, should the
Court set the jury's verdict aside, the plaintiff's claim
for wrongful death of the unborn fetus should not be
allowed.
In Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435,132 P.2d 114 (1942),
the Court previously considered and rejected the right
to recover for the wrongful death of an unborn child.
In Webb, the plaintiff brought an action for assault and
battery alleging that she suffered a miscarriage as a
result of the injuries inflicted upon her. The Court
stated:
While injuries resulting in a miscarriage are actionable, and compensation may be awarded for
the physical and mental sufferings experienced
by a woman who has a miscarriage by reason of
the injuries caused by the wrongful acts of others,
, :
damages are not awarded for "loss of the wtborn child" itself. 132 P.2d at 119. (Emphasis
supplied)
The view adopted in Webb is wholly justified in
light of legislative intent expressed in the wrongful
death statutes and remains consistent with economic,
as well as legal, realities.
Utah Code Ann. §78-11-6 (1953) provides that a
father, or in the case of his death or desertion of the
family, the mother may maintain an action for the death
of a "minor child." Since an action for wrongful death
did not exist at common law, any right to such a claim
must exist, if at all, only in accordance with the statutes
under which recovery is sought. Webb v. Denver <&
R.O.W. By. Co., 7 Utah 17, 24 P. 616 (1890).
14
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In Norman v. Murphy, 124 C.A. 2d 95, 268 P.2d
178 (1954), the California court considered a statute
substantially indistinguishable from Utah's and held
that the legislature did not intend to include unborn
children in the definition of "minor persons" within the
meaning of the California wrongful death statute. In
the absence of an unequivocal mandate from the legislature, the Court refused to indulge in legal fiction and
speculation concerning the claimed loss.
Similarly, the Utah legislature could easily have
created a separate and distinct right to recover for the
wrongful death of an unborn child, but it has not done
so. Since the decision of this Court in Webb v. Snow,
supra, it has been the law of this jurisdiction that no
separate and distinct action exists for the wrongful
death of an unborn child. The legislature, in more than
40 years since the decision, has not chosen to alter the
statute and its acquiescence should be viewed as support for the Court's present position.
The refusal to create a right of recovery for the
death of an unborn child is also consistent with economic realities. This Court has consistently held that
wrongful death actions are created to compensate survivors rather than to punish the tortfeasor. Consequently, damages for wrongful death are allowed only
for "the deprivation of some service, attention or care
that has in it the element of pecuniary value." Burbidge
v, Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 Utah 566, 196 P. 556
(1921). In the case of prenatal death there is no competent means of measuring any pecuniary value of the
child to the parents.
15
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Ever since 1884, when our legislature adopted the
statute permitting an action for the wrongful death of
a minor child, this Court has repeatedly held that damages for such a death are to based upon a "pecuniary
loss" and that damages for mental suffering and anguish resulting from the death are not recoverable.
Counsel for plaintiff presumptively was aware of this
statutory and decisional law and thus it is significant
to note that in the complaint which began this action,
there are no allegations suggesting any of the elements
of damage which our Court has recognized as being part
of a pecuniary loss. (E. 192.) Instead, the complaint
alleges the plaintiff "suffered the death of a viable
fetus, suffered great pain and mental distress, now
suffers and will continue to suffer great mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation, nervousness, nervous weakness, headaches and insomnia and will continue
to be unable to normally perform her household duties.''
Thus it is apparent that when plaintiff began this
action, she was not seeking the damages which are recoverable for wrongful death of a minor child and even
in her statement of facts in her brief in this Court,
plaintiff's claim of her damage is limited to the following statement:
As a result of the death of the fetus, plaintiff
has suffered extreme and prolonged emotional
distress. (Brief P. 3.)
These elements of sorrow and anguish do not furnish any basis for a damage recovery in a wrongful
death action as has been held by this Court at least
16
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since 1890 when the Court, in Webb v. Denver & R.G.W.
Ry Co.y supra reversed a trial court which had permitted a jury to consider mental suffering and sorrow
as an element of damage in a wrongful death case. In
its reversal, this Court said
We think the mental suffering of the heir, on
account of the death of a deceased relative, too
remote and sentimental to be a proper element
of damage under the statute . . .
The speculative nature of damages inherent in an
action for wrongful death of a fetus has been a principal factor in the wise decision of many other courts
throughout the country disallowing such a right of action. In Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E. 2d
425, 15 A.L.R. 3d 983 (1966), the Court stated:
It is virtually impossible to predict whether an
unborn child, but for its death, would have been
capable of giving pecuniary benefit to anyone.
None of the usual indicia such as mental and
physical capabilities, personality traits, aptitudes
and training of the wrongfully killed infant are
present. While it is true that the social position
of the parents may constitute a slight unit of
measure, the probable future earnings of a stillborn foetus are patently a matter of sheer speculation. An objection, in the same vein, specifically applicable to the wrongful death action is
that it can hardly be seriously contended that
the death of a foetus represents any real pecuniary loss to the parents. There may have been
a time when the average child went to work as
soon as he was able. That day has passed. Today,
the rearing of a child typically constitutes a great
pecuniary liability for the parents. 15 A.L.R. 3d
at 988.
17
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In short, the Court concluded that there can be no evidence from which to infer pecuniary loss to the surviving beneficiaries. The Court stated:
Our Death Act was not intended to grant damages against a tortfeasor merely to punish him.
We therefore hold that under our death act there
can be no right of recovery for the wrongful
death of an unborn child. Id. (Emphasis supplied)
The traditional rule recognized in this state and in
numerous other jurisdictions throughout the country is,
thus, entirely rational and supportive of sound judicial
policy. The Court should not permit juries to award
damages that are contrary to economic and social realities and supported only by rank speculation.
In summary, this Court should refuse to recognize
a separate and distinct cause of action for the wrongful
death of an unborn child. The legislature has not created such an action and to do so judicially would give
rise to unprecedented speculation in the computation of
damage awards. Consequently, the Court should affirm
the ruling of the trial court.

i

CONCLUSION

The jury's verdict exonerating Dr. Peterson of liability for the loss of the plaintiff's child is clearly
supported by and, indeed, compelled by the evidence on
trial.
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The plaintiff was afforded a full and fair opportunity to present her case to the jury and she has here
shown no error was committed that could reasonably
suggest a different result if the case were retried.
Plaintiff has failed to overcome the presumption of
validity of the judgment and this Court should affirm
that judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
John H. Snow
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent
Perry A. Peterson, J\i.D.
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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